Cases, Regulations, and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 2 | Number 6 Article 2
3-8-1991
Cases, Regulations, and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1991) "Cases, Regulations, and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 2: No. 6, Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol2/iss6/2
46                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law     Digest
A transaction stands the greatest chance of being treated
as a sale if initially characterized as a sale, reported as a sale
transaction and handled in good faith and if it represents a
valid business obligation.15  Any cancellation or forgive-
ness of a contract or mortgage payment should be carefully
established with evidence in writing to prove the
cancellation.16
Because forgiven payments must basically be reported as
though received, for income tax purposes,17 the best
strategy may be to collect all payments, pay the income
tax due and give back in a separate transaction part or all of
the remaining amount.
Below market interest rate.  For bargain purchase
transactions on an installment sale basis, the Tax Court and
the IRS maintain that the present value of the difference
between the interest rate used and the market rate of interest
at the time is a gift.18  The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeal disagrees and has held that an installment obligation
using an interest rate acceptable under the income tax rules
does not involve a gift.19  The latest Tax Court decision,
Krabbenhoft v. Comm'r,20 is on appeal to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeal.  At present, except for the Seventh
Circuit states of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, the
Krabbenhoft decision should be examined carefully from a
perspective of potential gift tax liability.
Example:  Parents sell land for $402,000 on a 20-year
installment contract at 6 percent interest to their son.
At the time, the market rate of interest is determined to
be 11 percent.  Figured at 11 percent, the value of the
contract is only $252,000.  Thus, the difference or
$150,000 is a gift from the parents to the son.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 7 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 46.09 (1990).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a).
3 I.R.C. § 453B(f).
4 I.R.C. § 453B(f)(2).
5 I.R.C. §§ 453B(f)(1), 453B(a)(2).
6 Ltr. Rul. 8739045, June 30, 1987
(no income to seller in cancelling
indebtedness as part of restructuring
of installment contract; no recogni-
tion of 1980 enactment of I.R.C. §
453B(f)).  See 2 Agric. L. Digest 1
(1991).
7 See I.R.C. § 2512.
8 29 T.C. 730 (1958).
9 See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
1 0 See note 8 supra.
1 1 42 T.C. 936 (1964), non acq.,
1977-2 C.B. 2.
1 2 63 T.C. 321 (1974), non acq.,
1977-2 C.B. 2.
1 3 1977-2 C.B. 343.
1 4 See note 8 supra.
1 5 See Ogle v. Comm'r, 1937 P-H
B.T.A. Mem. 384.
1 6 See Hudspeth v. Comm'r, 509
F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1975).
1 7 See I.R.C. § 453B(f).
1 8 Krabbenhoft v. Comm'r, 94 T.C.
No. 56 (1990).  See Ltr. Rul.
8804002, Sept. 3, 1987
(installment sale of stock to share-
holder's children at below market
rate was gift unless and to extent
purchase price included premium
sufficient to increase effective
interest rate); Ltr. Rul. 8512002,
Nov. 28, 1984 (promissory notes
for purchase of stock with interest
rate 2.355 percentage points below
interest rate of equivalent U.S.
Treasury obligations constituted
gift unless purchase price of stock
contained premium for reduced
interest rate).  See Fox v. U.S.,
88-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
13,770 (W.D. Va. 1988) (transfer
of real property in exchange for
promissory note was gift to extent
fair market value of property
exceeded amount of note).
1 9 Comm'r v. Ballard, 854 F.2d 185
(7th Cir. 1988) (sale of property at
below market interest rate was not
gift to extent interest rate below
market rate; for federal gift tax
purposes, market rate of interest
equal to interest rate established in
regulations under I.R.C. § 483
which applied to tax treatment of
installment sales).
2 0 Supra note 18.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION .  The plaintiff
asserted ownership of a one acre strip of land by adverse
possession.  The court held that the plaintiff's occasional
use of the property to maintain a fence and to pick blackber-
ries was not sufficiently continuous possession for title to
be acquired by adverse possession.  Harmon v. Ingram,
572 So.2d 411 (Ala. 1990).
FENCE.  When the defendant acquired a tract of farm
land bordering the plaintiff's land, a fence was placed around
the tract.  More than 20 years later the plaintiff was awarded
neighboring land in a court judgment, and after a survey of
the land, the fence was discovered to encroach upon the land
awarded in the judgment.  The court held that the more than
20 year open, continuous, hostile, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land by the defendant established owner-
ship by adverse possession before the court judgment;
therefore, the court judgment could not grant the disputed
land to the plaintiff.  Sashinger v. Wynn, 571 So.2d
1065 (Ala. 1990).
HOSTILE POSSESSION .  The plaintiff's and
defendant's lands had been separated by a fence for over 70
years, including the more than 20 years that the parties
owned their lands.  The plaintiff alleged that when the
defendant rebuilt the fence, the defendant had asked
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permission to replace the fence in the same location and that
the plaintiff's permission to do so negated the defendant's
hostile possession of the land between the fence and the true
boundary.  The court held that the defendant's use of the
disputed land for grazing cattle and cutting hay was a hostile
possession not overcome by the plaintiff's alleged
permission.  Tillison v. Taylor, 572 So.2d 4 2 9
(Ala. 1990).
BANKING
CONTRACTS .  As part of an attempt to refinance
their farming debt, the plaintiffs negotiated with the defen-
dant bank for a three to five year loan; however, the loan
agreement signed by the parties required full repayment of
the loan less than seven months later.  The court held that
the loan agreement was full and complete as written and
extrinsic evidence of the negotiations was not admissable.
The court also held that the signed loan agreement was not
an adhesion contract where the parties bargained for the
agreement.  The court also held that the bank was not liable
as a fiduciary resulting from a joint adventure between the
parties because the bank did not receive a share of the profits
but, under the loan agreement, was to receive a fixed amount
independent of the profits of the plaintiffs' operations.
Batterman v. Wells Fargo Agric. Credit Corp. ,
802 P.2d 1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtors had entered into
a one year lease of farm land which expired during the
Chapter 11 case.  The lessor had informed the debtor of the
termination of the lease and posted no trespassing signs on
the property after the lease terminated.  The court held that
the notification and termination of the lease did not violate
the automatic stay as provided by Section 362(b)(10).
Erickson v. Polk, 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1990).
DISCHARGE.  A creditor obtained a jury verdict of
fraud against the debtor and argued that the judgment was
nondischargeable under Section 523.  In instructions to the
jury, the trial court instructed the jury to use a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.  The debtor argued that the
fraud judgment was not entitled to collateral estoppel
because the dischargeability of a claim for fraud requires a
clear and convincing standard of proof in bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court held that the preponderance of the evidence
standard applied in bankruptcy cases for determining fraud
for purposes of Section 523 and the fraud judgment was not
dischargeable.  Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 6 5 4
(1991), rev'g 881 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1989) ,
rev'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g 73 B.R. 2 6
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The debtor's interest in an
ERISA qualified employee benefit plan was held included in
bankruptcy estate property because the Section 541(c)(2)
exclusion for property subject to alienation restrictions does
not apply to employee benefit plans eligible for exemption
under Section 522.  In re  Nadler, 122 B.R. 1 6 2
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor owned a residence with a
nondebtor spouse as tenants by the entireties. The residence
was claimed as an exemption.  The debtor received a
discharge in Chapter 7 and a creditor of both spouses sought
relief from the injunction against the residence.  Under Ind.
Code § 34-2-28-1(a)(5), a debtor's interest in property owned
as tenants by the entireties is exempt as to a joint creditor
unless the other tenant is a joint debtor in the bankruptcy
case. The court held that the debtor's discharge extinguished
the debtor's obligation as to the creditor's claim against the
residence thus preventing the creditor from satisfying the
claim from the residence.  Matter of Hunter, 122 B.R.
349 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990).
The debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified retirement
plan was held to be estate property and not eligible for an
exemption under Fla. Stat. § 222.21(2)(a) because the
statute was pre-empted by ERISA.  In re  Pruner, 1 2 2
B.R. 459 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
The debtors claimed a homestead exemption in their
residence which was built on land owned by a third party.
The trustee failed to object to the exemption until 34 days
later, 4 days after the Rule 4003(b) limit.  The trustee
argued that the exemption was invalid because the debtors
could not exempt property recovered after a voluntary
transfer and that a timely objection was not needed to deny
the exemption.  The court held that the exemption would be
allowed because the debtors had a good faith statutory basis
for claiming the exemption, even though that basis may be
incorrect if litigated.  In re  Peterson, 920 F.2d 1 3 8 9
(8th Cir. 1990).
MARSHALLING.  After the debtor defaulted on lum-
ber contracts, the bond holder paid on the performance bond
and sought marshalling of assets, logs, held by another
creditor.  The court held that the bond holder could not
petition for marshalling because the bond payment was not
made to a holder of a lien against the logs.  In re  Brazier
Forest Products, Inc., 921 F.2d 221 (9th Cir .
1990) .
  CHAPTER 7
DISCHARGE.  The debtors had transferred horses and
several pieces of farm equipment to their children for less
than adequate consideration more than one year before filing
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  After the transfers, the property was
kept on the debtors' property and the debtors claimed income
tax deductions for expenses related to the horses.  The
debtors' children live with them.  The debtors were denied
discharge under Section 727(a)(2)(A) for transfer of the
property with intent to defraud creditors.  Under the doctrine
of continuing concealment, the retention by the debtors of
the benefits of the property carried the date of the transfer
into the period within one year before the bankruptcy filing.
In re  Essres, 122 B.R. 422 (Bankr. D. C o l o .
1990) .
  CHAPTER 12
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AUTOMATIC STAY .  In a federal nonbankruptcy
case, the debtors filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff
creditor and two days before trial filed Chapter 12
bankruptcy.  The debtors argued that the automatic stay
prevented their pursuance of the counterclaim except in
bankruptcy.  The court held that because the counterclaim
was initiated by the debtors pre-bankruptcy and the debtors
as debtors-in-possession had the power to pursue the
counterclaim, the debtors' failure to do so warranted
dismissal of the counterclaim.  Merchants & Farmers
Bank of Dumas v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539 (E .D.
Ark. 1990).
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtors operated a traditional farm
and a sawmill in which they cut lumber from trees they
harvested from their land.  The debtors owed an amount to
the Small Business Administration for the logging and
sawmill operations in excess of 20 percent of all claims
filed in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy case.  The court held that
the logging and sawmill operations were not farming and
the debtors were not eligible for Chapter 12.  In the alterna-
tive, the court dismissed the Chapter 12 case for bad faith
filing where the debtors had received a discharge in a
previous Chapter 11 case in which the debtors had
negotiated a confirmed plan with creditors and the debtors
had not applied unexpected income to make payments under
that plan.  In re  Miller, 122 B.R. 360 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1990).
PLAN MODIFICATION.  The debtors proposed to
modify their Chapter 12 plan to skip one annual payment
and to add the skipped payment as an additional payment at
the end of the plan.  In denying the modification, the court
held that although the feasibility of the initial plan was not
raised in the confirmation process, the proposed modifica-
tion and inability of the debtors to meet projected income
and expenses demonstrated that the debtors' plan was not
feasible, even with the proposed modifications.  In re
Larson, 122 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
  CHAPTER 13
PLAN.  Under the debtors' Chapter 13 plan, the debtors
would transfer collateral equivalent to a secured creditor's
claim to the creditor in satisfaction of the claim.  The value
of the collateral was to be the value stated by the creditor
before the plan was proposed.  The creditor objected, arguing
that the creditor should be allowed to sell the collateral and
have the right to assert a deficiency claim if the collateral
proceeds do not satisfy the claim.  The court agreed with the
creditor and held that the creditor would have an unsecured
claim for any deficiency.  In re  Claypool, 122 B . .
371 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR
TAXES .  The court held that the Chapter 11 plan could
not allocate plan payments for federal taxes where the alloca-
tion was not necessary for a successful reorganization.  In
re  GLK, Inc., 921 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1990).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  A federal tax lien was not
avoidable under Section 506(d).  In re  McCullough,
122 B.R. 251 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN.  The IRS moved for
modification of the debtor's confirmed plan because the IRS
had approved the plan when the IRS mistakenly believed
that the plan would contain different terms.  The court
denied the modification because the plan provided for full
payment of the IRS claim, albeit at a lesser interest rate and
longer term than the IRS wanted.  In re  Poteet Const .
Co., Inc., 122 B.R. 616 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1990) .
DISCHARGE.  The debtor's income tax liability was
held nondischargeable where the liability arose from the
debtor's false W-4 forms claiming excessive deductions.  In
re  Gilder, 122 B.R. 593 (Bankr. M.D. F la .
1990) .
PRIORITY.  The debtor, a general partner, was held to
be a responsible person liable for the employee withholding
taxes of the partnership.  The partner's liability for such
taxes was held nondischargeable as priority taxes under
Section 523(a)(1).  In re  Ross, 122 B.R. 4 6 2
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has affirmed an
interim rule adding North Carolina and New Jersey to the
list of validated brucellosis-free states.  56 Fed. R e g .
4936-37 (Feb. 7, 1991) .  The APHIS has affirmed an
interim rule changing the classification of Arkansas from
Class B to Class A.  56 Fed. Reg. 4937 (Feb. 7 ,
1991) .
FARMER OWNED RESERVE.  The CCC has
adopted as final changes to the FOR regulations implement-
ing the changes made by the 1990 farm bill.  56 Fed.
Reg. 5745 (Feb. 13, 1991).
FARM LOANS .  The FmHA has issued proposed
regulations requiring FmHA insured loan borrowers to grant
to the FmHA a security interest in all of the borrower's
property.  56 Fed. Reg. 6315 (Feb. 15, 1991).
PRICE SUPPORT-PROGRAM CROPS .  The
CCC has issued proposed determinations for 1991-1995
price support and production adjustment programs for wheat,
feed grains, cotton, rice and oilseeds: (1) what crops may be
planted on "flexible acreage", (2) what crops are permitted
on "0/92 and 50/92" permitted acreage, and (3) what oilseed
crops are eligible to be pledged as collateral for price support
loans.  56 Fed. Reg. 6366 (Feb. 15, 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
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ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  Prior to death,
the decedent entered into a foal-sharing contract under which
the decedent granted to the stud owner a one-half interest in
any foal in exchange for stud services.  Under the contract in
the case of the decedent's death, the stud owner was to
receive cash payment for the one-half interest in the foal.
The decedent's mare was not impregnated until after the
decedent's death.  After the decedent's death, the estate paid
the stud owner the contracted amount in cash and claimed
the payment as an administrative expense deduction on the
estate return.  The court held that federal law applied to
determine whether the payment was an administrative
expense.  The court also held that the expense was not a
deductible administrative expense because the payment was
not of the nature of a payment to persons for helping
administer the estate but was only a payment for acquisition
of an asset.  Est. of Love v. Comm'r, 91-1 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,056 (4th Cir. 1991).
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
bequeathed property in trust to a brother with split remainder
interests to a nephew and a church.  After the IRS disal-
lowed a charitable deduction for the present value of the
remainder interest to the church under I.R.C. §
2055(e)(2)(A), the estate made a cash gift to the church equal
to the present value of the remainder interest.  The court
held that the cash gift was also nondeductible as an attempt
to bypass the requirements of Section 2055(e)(2)(A).  Est .
of Perrin v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. No. 8 (1991).
CLAIM FOR REFUND .  In 1980 in a negotiated
settlement with the IRS on the decedent's estate tax
liability, the executrix and IRS agent included a provision
allowing the estate to file for a refund resulting from any
future audit of the decedent's last personal income tax return.
After an audit of the decedent's personal income tax return in
1984 which resulted in additional taxes paid, the estate filed
for a refund.  The court held that the statute of limitations
had run for filing a refund request and that the doctrine of
equitable recoupment could not be used because the IRS was
not asserting any additional taxes in the refund claim.  In
addition, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not available
because the estate settlement agreement did not specifically
extend the limitations period for filing a refund.  Bedell v .
U.S., 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 6 0 , 0 5 7
(S.D. N.Y. 1991).
DISCLAIMER.  Within nine months after the dece-
dent's death, the surviving spouse made a disclaimer of any
survivorship interest in property owned by the decedent and
the surviving spouse as tenants by the entireties.  The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer was timely.  Ltr. R u l .
9106015, Nov. 8, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The decedent devised property to a trust with a friend, 40
years younger than the decedent, having a lifetime interest in
trust income with the remainder to pass to the decedent's
daughter.  The IRS ruled that the friend was a skip person
and the daughter was a non-skip person.  Under Section
2652(c)(1)(A), the friend was considered to have a present
interest in the trust property such that the entire value of the
property was subject to GSTT and not just the value of the
income interest transferred to the friend.  Ltr. R u l .
9105006, Oct. 12, 1990.
An irrevocable trust had been established prior to
September 25, 1985 and the trustee proposed to reform
several provisions of the trust, including restricting the
types of investments and changing the provisions for
successor trustees.  The beneficiary also released the power
to appoint trust property to descendants of the grantor.  The
IRS ruled that none of the changes would subject the trust
to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9106014, Nov. 8, 1990.
The taxpayer proposed to bequeath property by will to a
grandchild whose parent, the taxpayer's child, had died.  The
grandchild was adopted by the surviving parent's second
spouse.  The IRS ruled that the grandchild was not a skip
person because the adoption did not negate the effect of
Section 2612(c)(2) at the death of the taxpayer's child, the
grandchild's parent.  Ltr. Rul. 9106034, Nov. 1 3 ,
1990 .
GIFT.  The taxpayer established a ten-year trust funded
with S corporation stock and with the taxpayer as income
beneficiary.  If the taxpayer died before the ten-year period
ended, the trust property passed as appointed by the taxpayer
by will.  At the end of the ten years, if the taxpayer survived
the trust, the trust property passed to the taxpayer's living
children.  If a child beneficiary was not over the age of 30,
the child's interest passed to a trust until the child reached 30
with the child receiving quarterly income payments until
reaching age 30 when the trust corpus was to be distributed.
The IRS ruled that the transfer of the stock to the trust was
a completed gift valued using the actuarial tables under the
taxpayer's age. Ltr. Rul. 9105030, Nov. 6, 1990.
The taxpayer was a controlling shareholder in a closely-
held corporation and had endorsed a note given by the corpo-
ration on a loan.  The taxpayer transferred stock in another
corporation to the closely-held corporation without receiving
a note or stock from the corporation in consideration for the
stock.  The taxpayer argued that the stock transfer was in
satisfaction of the taxpayer's liability on the note, but the
court held that the stock transfer was a gift to the closely-
held corporation shareholders, most of whom were members
of the taxpayer's family, and an attempt to avoid recognition
of gain on the stock by the taxpayer.    Est. of Higgins
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-47.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's 1980
will devised residuary estate property to a marital trust with
the limitation that the amount was not to exceed the
maximum required to reduce the estate tax to zero after
application of available credits.  The court held that the
devise was not a maximum marital deduction formula clause
subject to the ERTA transitional rule and the estate was
allowed an unlimited marital deduction.  Est. of Higgins
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-47.
RETURNS .  The decedent's estate had two co-execu-
tors who filed a Form 706 for the estate in August 1988 but
one of the co-executors failed to sign the return.  The IRS
sent a form letter asking for the missing signature on the
letter.  After the co-executor signed and returned the form
letter, the co-executors filed another Form 706 in November
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1988, claiming that the first return was incomplete because
the co-executor signed the form letter only as an individual.
The IRS ruled that the form letter requested the co-executor's
signature as a co-executor of the estate; therefore, the form
letter perfected the first Form 706 which was the estate's
return.  Ltr. Rul. 9105003, Oct. 12, 1990.
The IRS has announced that Form 2848, Power of
Attorney and Declaration of Representative, and Form 2848-
D, Tax Information Authorization and Declaration of
Representative, have been extended to March 31, 1991.
New forms will be issued in April 1991.  Ann. 91 -14 ,
I.R.B. 1991-5, 6.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS.
The taxpayer was awarded actual and punitive damages in a
personal injury action for employment-related exposure to
asbestos.  The IRS ruled that the punitive damages award is
includible in the taxpayer's income.  The award was received
prior to the effective date of the 1989 amendment to I.R.C.
§ 104(a).  Ltr. Rul. 9106013, Nov. 7, 1990.
DISASTER LOSSES.  The IRS has issued a list of
areas determined by the President to be disaster areas in 1990
in which taxpayers may elect to take a loss deduction in the
return for the taxable year immediately preceding the taxable
year in which the disaster occurred.  Rev. Rul. 91 -10 ,
I.R.B. 1991-7, 6.
EVASION.  After attending tax seminars, the taxpayer
believed that the federal income tax on wages was unconsti-
tutional and stopped filing income tax returns and declared
excessive dependents on Form W-2.  The taxpayer partici-
pated in or witnessed several court cases involving these
issues which consistently upheld the constitutionality of the
federal income tax.  The trial court instructed the jury that
the jury could disregard the taxpayer's evidence of the tax-
payer's understanding of the tax laws in determining whether
the taxpayer's failure to file tax returns was willful.  The
appellate court affirmed the jury verdict against the taxpayer
and held that the taxpayer must have a good-faith belief as to
the taxpayer's interpretation of the tax laws that is objec-
tively reasonable.  The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the jury should be allowed to consider the evidence of
the taxpayer's beliefs in determining whether the taxpayer's
failure to file tax returns was willful.  The jury should not
be allowed to consider, however, the taxpayer's claims that
the tax laws were unconstitutional, given the taxpayer's
statutory rights to challenge the tax laws through petitions
for refunds. Cheek v. U.S., 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991) ,
rev'g and rem'g 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989).
INTEREST.  The IRS has ruled that interest earned on
dividends accumulated on a converted U.S. Government Life
Insurance policy or on a National Service Life Insurance
policy is not subject to federal income tax.  Rev. R u l .
91-14, I.R.B. 1991-9, 10.
LETTER RULINGS.  The IRS has issued a checklist
of requirements for ruling requests involving the issue of
classification of an entity as a limited partnership under
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.  Rev. Proc. 91-13, I .R.B.
1991-6, 16 .  The IRS has issued a checklist of require-
ments for ruling requests involving the issue of classifica-
tion of an entity as a liquidating trust under Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-4.  Rev. Proc. 91-15, I.R.B. 1991-6, 23.
PARTNERSHIPS.
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The court held
that a final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA)
was valid when sent to a limited partner where the desig-
nated tax matters partner had died and no new TMP had been
designated.  The partnership was allowed to file an amended
petition where the original petition was filed by the son of
the deceased TMP but the son was not a partner.
Starlight Mine v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
59 .  
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS
has announced the 1990 and 1991 inflation adjusted amounts
of debt instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount
rate limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
     or     Exchange                                                                                                                                                                          Amount                                         Amount        
1990 $2,933,200 $2,095,100
1991 $3,079,600 $2,199,700
Rev. Rul. 91-11, I.R.B. 1991-6, 7.
RETIREMENT PLANS . The IRS announced the
January 1991 weighted average interest rate of 8.63 percent
and the permissible range of interest rates, 7.77 to 9.49
percent, for use in calculating liability for purposes of the
full funding limitation under section 412(c)(7).  Notice
91-5, I.R.B. 1991-7, 23.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
MARCH 1991
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.85 6.74 6.68 6.65
110% AFR 7.55 7.41 7.34 7.30
120% AFR 8.25 8.09 8.01 7.96
Mid-term
AFR 7.82 7.67 7.60 7.55
110% AFR 8.62 8.44 8.35 8.30
120% AFR 9.41 9.20 9.10 9.03
Long-term
AFR 8.21 8.05 7.97 7.92
110% AFR 9.06 8.86 8.76 8.70
120% AFR 9.89 9.66 9.55 9.47
S CORPORATIONS
ACCOUNTING METHOD.  A family farm C corpora-
tion was required to change to accrual accounting and main-
tain a suspense account under I.R.C. § 447.  The IRS ruled
that if the corporation elects S corporation status, the corpo-
ration will be required to maintain the suspense account but
will not recognize gain or income from the election unless
or until any reduction or recapture of amounts in the
account.  Any reduction or recapture of the suspense account
during the ten years after the S corporation election will be
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treated as built-in gain under I.R.C. § 1374.  Ltr. R u l .
9106009, Nov. 6, 1990.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK.  Proposed regulations
involving the one class of stock requirement for S corpora-
tions have been revised to be effective prospectively.  See 1
Agric. Law Digest 205.  IR-91-25, Feb. 12, 1991.
TERMINATION.  The termination of an S corporation's
status was ruled inadvertent where the corporation formed a
wholly-owned subsidiary using an attorney who was not
aware that the corporation had elected S corporation status.
Ltr. Rul. 9105013, Oct. 31, 1990.
TRUSTS.  The taxpayer established a ten-year trust
funded with S corporation stock and with the taxpayer as
beneficiary.  At the end of the ten years, if the taxpayer
survives the trust, the trust property would pass to the
taxpayer's living children.  If a child was not over the age of
30, the child's interest would pass to a trust until the child
reaches 30 with the child receiving quarterly income
payments until reaching age 30 when the trust corpus was
to be distributed.  The IRS ruled that the trusts for the
children would qualify as subchapter S trusts. Ltr. R u l .
9105030, Nov. 6, 1990.
MORTGAGES
TIMBER.  The defendant lumber companies entered
into contracts to cut timber on land owned by the debtor
which was subject to a mortgage held by the plaintiff.  The
plaintiff alleged that the timber was cut and removed
without the written consent of the plaintiff.  The court held
that the plaintiff had only the rights of the debtor to recover
for collateral removed without written consent.  The
plaintiff was denied recovery because the debtor had granted
the defendants the right to remove the timber in a written
contract.  First South Prod. Credit Ass'n v .
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 572 So.2d 218 (La. C t .
App. 1990).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HAY BALER.   The plaintiff was injured when an
arm was entangled in the power-fed compression rollers of a
hay baler manufactured by the defendant.  The plaintiff also
sued, under Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts §
324A, the liability insurer of the defendant because the
insurer provided safety inspections of the hay baler for the
defendant.  The court held that the insurer was not liable to
the plaintiff under Section 324A(a) because of the inspec-
tions because the plaintiff failed to show that the inspec-
tions changed the hay baler so as to make it dangerous to
the plaintiff.  However, the court held that summary
judgment for the insurer was denied under Section 324A(b)
because the insurer undertook part of the manufacturer's duty
to warn and to design reasonably safe products.  In addition,
the insurer was liable under Section 324(c) because the
manufacturer relied on the insurer's inspections to produce a
safe product.  A contract provision negating the insurer's
duty to the manufacturer's customers was void as contrary to
public policy.  Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 5 2
F.Supp. 989 (D. Kan. 1990).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE.  The
debtor sold cattle to the defendant which were subject to a
security interest granted to the plaintiff bank.  The bank had
filed its security interest under the state U.C.C. but had not
filed with the Nebraska central filing system under the
federal farm products rule, 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e).  The bank
claimed that the defendant paid substantially less for the
cattle than their fair market value and sued for the balance.
The bank argued that the defendant did not purchase the
cattle free of the security interest under the federal farm
products rule because the defendant had actual knowledge of
the security interest when informed by the debtor at the sale.
The defendant had paid for the cattle with a joint check to
the debtor and the bank.  The bank also claimed that the
federal farm products rule filing requirements did not apply
because the debtor's refusal to sign a new financing state-
ment prevented the filing of the security interest with the
Nebraska central filing system.  The court held that the bank
had sufficient documents, including the U.C.C. financing
statement signed by the debtor, to attempt a filing with the
central filing system.  The bank also failed to meet the
alternative federal requirements of giving the buyer direct
written notice of its security interest.  Therefore, the
defendant purchased the cattle free of the security interest.
The court noted that the federal rule had no good faith buyer
requirement.  Lisco State Bank v. McCombs
Ranches, Inc., 752 F.Supp. 329 (D. Neb. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE .  The plaintiffs owned 20
acre and one acre parcels of land contiguous to a 500 acre
tract owned by a third party and leased as cattle pasture.  The
plaintiffs argued that their land should have been assessed as
agricultural because the land was included in the pasture
lease.  The court held that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-102 did
not require that owners use their land for grazing their own
cattle in order to classify the land as agricultural.  In
addition, the consideration of the purchase price of the land
was not a factor which may be considered in determining
whether land was agricultural.  The court also held that
residential improvements on the land were not required to be
related to the agricultural use.  The case was remanded for
the above errors and for a determination as to whether the
land involved was included in the pasture lease.  Staack v .
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 802 P.2d 1191 (Co lo .
Ct. App. 1990).
AGRICULTURAL LAW DIGEST
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TRESPASS
DAMAGES .  In clearing a road through timber prop-
erty, the defendants mistakenly cut down several trees on the
plaintiff's property.  The plaintiff testified as to the value of
the cut trees as to the plaintiff's "use or aesthetic use of the
property."  The court held that such evidence was
insufficient to award damages for the loss of the trees.  The
case was remanded to show the fair market value of the
trees; however, if the trees were shown to have no substan-
tial fair market value, the damages were to be based on the
loss of fair market value of the land from the cutting.
Breiding v. Wells, 800 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. C t .
App. 1990).
VETERINARIANS
ASSUMPTION OF RISK.  The plaintiff veterinar-
ian was bitten by the defendant's dog during a pre-neutering
examination.  Within five minutes after the examination
began, the dog snapped at the plaintiff who refused to
proceed with the exam until the dog was muzzled.  The
exam proceeded after the dog was muzzled but after the exam
the plaintiff removed the muzzle and the dog bit him.  The
court ruled that the veterinarian assumed the risk of injury
by removing the muzzle after being shown the dog's
propensity to bite.  Cohen v. McIntyre, 277 Cal .
Rptr. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Comm'r,
921 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g T . C .
Memo. 1989-264 (installment reporting of gain) see p.
43 supra.
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